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DDC 338.8/20973
B 17
Baker, Jonathan B. ,
The antitrust paradigm : : restoring a competitive economy / / Jonathan B. Baker. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : : Harvard University Press,, ©2019. - 1 online resource (349 pages). - Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-336) and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/02EA125C-C7D6-4998-ABEF-658920C599B7. - ISBN 9780674238947 (electronic book). - ISBN 067423894X (electronic book). - ISBN 9780674238954 (epub). - ISBN 0674238958 (epub). - ISBN 9780674238961 (mobi). - ISBN 0674238966 (mobi)
Print version record.
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Baker, Jonathan B. Antitrust paradigm. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - ISBN 9780674975781
~РУБ DDC 338.8/20973
Рубрики: Antitrust law--Economic aspects--United States.
Competition--United States.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS--Industries--General.
Antitrust law--Economic aspects.
Competition.
Economic history.
Economic policy.
LAW / Antitrust
United States--Economic policy.
United States--Economic conditions, 1945-
United States.
Аннотация: In the 1970s, when the United States economy was struggling and the term "stagflation" was coined to capture inflation plus stagnant business growth, the "Chicago school" critique of antitrust rules gained ascendance. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's two terms as president, that critique's policy prescriptions-the eliminating of or modifying anticompetitive rules to make them less restrictive-became common practice. As Jonathan Baker writes, "The Chicago approach to antitrust can be understood as a gamble. More relaxed antitrust rules would allow firms to achieve greater efficiencies, which would more than compensate for any risk of firms exercising market power. Put differently, the Chicagoans bet that antitrust reform could achieve long term consumer welfare gains without facilitating the creation of substantial and durable market power." The Antitrust Paradigm presents a wealth of evidence arguing that the Chicagoans lost their bet, and prescribes what should be done about it. Since the 1980s, not only has market power widened, economic productivity decline, and consumer welfare gains been modest at best, but also the economy has changed, most visibly in the information technology and Internet giants that top the financial market's valuation charts. Baker argues that both the failures of antitrust reform and the changed economy demand a new antitrust paradigm, one that restores a competitive economy through strengthened antitrust, recognizes antitrust's political context, and identifies the competitive harms from dominant information technology platforms. His book frames the problem, examines the distinctive competitive problems of the information economy, and concludes with a guide for restoring effective antitrust policies.--
At a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power, Jonathan Baker shows how laws and regulations can be updated to ensure more competition. The sooner courts and antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.
B 17
Baker, Jonathan B. ,
The antitrust paradigm : : restoring a competitive economy / / Jonathan B. Baker. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : : Harvard University Press,, ©2019. - 1 online resource (349 pages). - Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-336) and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/02EA125C-C7D6-4998-ABEF-658920C599B7. - ISBN 9780674238947 (electronic book). - ISBN 067423894X (electronic book). - ISBN 9780674238954 (epub). - ISBN 0674238958 (epub). - ISBN 9780674238961 (mobi). - ISBN 0674238966 (mobi)
Print version record.
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Baker, Jonathan B. Antitrust paradigm. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - ISBN 9780674975781
Рубрики: Antitrust law--Economic aspects--United States.
Competition--United States.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS--Industries--General.
Antitrust law--Economic aspects.
Competition.
Economic history.
Economic policy.
LAW / Antitrust
United States--Economic policy.
United States--Economic conditions, 1945-
United States.
Аннотация: In the 1970s, when the United States economy was struggling and the term "stagflation" was coined to capture inflation plus stagnant business growth, the "Chicago school" critique of antitrust rules gained ascendance. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's two terms as president, that critique's policy prescriptions-the eliminating of or modifying anticompetitive rules to make them less restrictive-became common practice. As Jonathan Baker writes, "The Chicago approach to antitrust can be understood as a gamble. More relaxed antitrust rules would allow firms to achieve greater efficiencies, which would more than compensate for any risk of firms exercising market power. Put differently, the Chicagoans bet that antitrust reform could achieve long term consumer welfare gains without facilitating the creation of substantial and durable market power." The Antitrust Paradigm presents a wealth of evidence arguing that the Chicagoans lost their bet, and prescribes what should be done about it. Since the 1980s, not only has market power widened, economic productivity decline, and consumer welfare gains been modest at best, but also the economy has changed, most visibly in the information technology and Internet giants that top the financial market's valuation charts. Baker argues that both the failures of antitrust reform and the changed economy demand a new antitrust paradigm, one that restores a competitive economy through strengthened antitrust, recognizes antitrust's political context, and identifies the competitive harms from dominant information technology platforms. His book frames the problem, examines the distinctive competitive problems of the information economy, and concludes with a guide for restoring effective antitrust policies.--
At a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power, Jonathan Baker shows how laws and regulations can be updated to ensure more competition. The sooner courts and antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.
2.
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DDC 343.7307/25
S 15
Sagers, Christopher L. , (1970-).
United States v. Apple : competition in America / Chris Sagers. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - 1 online resource. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/BCB9A395-AD5B-44D6-9A58-E421F599A6D4. - ISBN 0674243285 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 9780674243286 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 9780674243293 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 0674243293 (electronic bk.)
Description based on print version record
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Sagers, Christopher L., 1970- United States v. Apple. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - ISBN 9780674972216
Содержание:
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Dedication; Epigraph; Contents; Introduction: A Case Bigger Than It Seemed; PART I. POLICY AS PROLOGUE; 1. The Great Generalization; 2. In the First Ships: Competition as a Concept and Its Special Role in American History; 3. And Yet, Uncertainty: The Long Shadows of the American Methodenstreit; 4. Uncertainty of Another Kind: Coping with Capitalism through Association and Self-Help; 5. Tensions of the Latter Day and Some Unexpected Skepticism; 6. Competition as a Living Policy, circa 2019; PART II. THE EBOOKS CASE; 7. The Old Business of Books
8. Bookselling and the Birth of Amazon9. Publishers, Booksellers, and the Oldest Problem in the World; 10. Price-Fixing in Books; 11. Content and the Digital Transition in Historical Context; 12. The Promise and Threat of Electronic Books; 13. How Electronic Books Came to Be, and What It Would Mean for the Apple Case; 14. Google Books; 15. The Kindle; 16. The eBooks Conspiracy; PART III. COMPETITION AND ITS MANY REGRETS; 17. The Long Agony of Antitrust; 18. So Are Books, After All, Special? Is Anything?; 19. The Virtues of Vertical and Entry for Its Own Sake; 20. Amazon
21. The Threat to Writers and the Threat to Cultural Values22. The Creeping Profusion of Externalities; Conclusion: Real Ironies; Notes; Acknowledgments; Index
~РУБ DDC 343.7307/25
Рубрики: Price fixing--United States.
Restraint of trade--United States.
Antitrust law--United States.
Publishers and publishing--United States.
LAW / Antitrust
Antitrust law
Price fixing
Publishers and publishing
Restraint of trade
United States
Аннотация: One of the most followed antitrust cases of recent times--United States v. Apple--reveals a missed truth: what Americans most fear is competition itself. In 2012 the Department of Justice accused Apple and five book publishers of conspiring to fix e-book prices. The evidence overwhelmingly showed an unadorned price-fixing conspiracy that cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet before, during, and after the trial millions of Americans sided with the defendants. Pundits on the left and right condemned the government for its decision to sue, decrying Amazon's market share, railing against a new high-tech economy, and rallying to defend beloved authors and publishers. For many, Amazon was the one that should have been put on trial. But why? One fact went unrecognized and unreckoned with: in practice, Americans have long been ambivalent about competition. Chris Sagers, a renowned antitrust expert, meticulously pulls apart the misunderstandings and exaggerations that industries as diverse as mom-and-pop grocers and producers of cast-iron sewer pipes have cited to justify colluding to forestall competition. In each of these cases, antitrust law, a time-honored vehicle to promote competition, is put on the defensive. Herein lies the real insight of United States v. Apple. If we desire competition as a policy, we must make peace with its sometimes rough consequences. As bruising as markets in their ordinary operation often seem, letting market forces play out has almost always benefited the consumer. United States v. Apple shows why supporting cases that protect price competition, even when doing so hurts some of us, is crucial if antitrust law is to protect and maintain markets.--
S 15
Sagers, Christopher L. , (1970-).
United States v. Apple : competition in America / Chris Sagers. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - 1 online resource. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/BCB9A395-AD5B-44D6-9A58-E421F599A6D4. - ISBN 0674243285 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 9780674243286 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 9780674243293 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 0674243293 (electronic bk.)
Description based on print version record
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Sagers, Christopher L., 1970- United States v. Apple. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019. - ISBN 9780674972216
Содержание:
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Dedication; Epigraph; Contents; Introduction: A Case Bigger Than It Seemed; PART I. POLICY AS PROLOGUE; 1. The Great Generalization; 2. In the First Ships: Competition as a Concept and Its Special Role in American History; 3. And Yet, Uncertainty: The Long Shadows of the American Methodenstreit; 4. Uncertainty of Another Kind: Coping with Capitalism through Association and Self-Help; 5. Tensions of the Latter Day and Some Unexpected Skepticism; 6. Competition as a Living Policy, circa 2019; PART II. THE EBOOKS CASE; 7. The Old Business of Books
8. Bookselling and the Birth of Amazon9. Publishers, Booksellers, and the Oldest Problem in the World; 10. Price-Fixing in Books; 11. Content and the Digital Transition in Historical Context; 12. The Promise and Threat of Electronic Books; 13. How Electronic Books Came to Be, and What It Would Mean for the Apple Case; 14. Google Books; 15. The Kindle; 16. The eBooks Conspiracy; PART III. COMPETITION AND ITS MANY REGRETS; 17. The Long Agony of Antitrust; 18. So Are Books, After All, Special? Is Anything?; 19. The Virtues of Vertical and Entry for Its Own Sake; 20. Amazon
21. The Threat to Writers and the Threat to Cultural Values22. The Creeping Profusion of Externalities; Conclusion: Real Ironies; Notes; Acknowledgments; Index
Рубрики: Price fixing--United States.
Restraint of trade--United States.
Antitrust law--United States.
Publishers and publishing--United States.
LAW / Antitrust
Antitrust law
Price fixing
Publishers and publishing
Restraint of trade
United States
Аннотация: One of the most followed antitrust cases of recent times--United States v. Apple--reveals a missed truth: what Americans most fear is competition itself. In 2012 the Department of Justice accused Apple and five book publishers of conspiring to fix e-book prices. The evidence overwhelmingly showed an unadorned price-fixing conspiracy that cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. Yet before, during, and after the trial millions of Americans sided with the defendants. Pundits on the left and right condemned the government for its decision to sue, decrying Amazon's market share, railing against a new high-tech economy, and rallying to defend beloved authors and publishers. For many, Amazon was the one that should have been put on trial. But why? One fact went unrecognized and unreckoned with: in practice, Americans have long been ambivalent about competition. Chris Sagers, a renowned antitrust expert, meticulously pulls apart the misunderstandings and exaggerations that industries as diverse as mom-and-pop grocers and producers of cast-iron sewer pipes have cited to justify colluding to forestall competition. In each of these cases, antitrust law, a time-honored vehicle to promote competition, is put on the defensive. Herein lies the real insight of United States v. Apple. If we desire competition as a policy, we must make peace with its sometimes rough consequences. As bruising as markets in their ordinary operation often seem, letting market forces play out has almost always benefited the consumer. United States v. Apple shows why supporting cases that protect price competition, even when doing so hurts some of us, is crucial if antitrust law is to protect and maintain markets.--
Page 1, Results: 2