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M 70
Mills, Ethan.
Three pillars of skepticism in classical India : : Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa / / Ethan Mills. - Lanham, Maryland : : Lexington Books,, [2018]. - 1 online resource. - (Studies in comparative philosophy and religion). - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/BB5224AE-AFC3-4688-A497-F2C0A2F4467B. - ISBN 9781498555708 (electronic book). - ISBN 1498555705 (electronic book)
6.5 Śrī Harṣa's Development of Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism. Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 06, 2018).
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Mills, Ethan Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India : Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa. - : Lexington Books,c2018. - ISBN 9781498555692
Содержание:
Cover; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India; Series page; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations for Classical Texts; Introduction; 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India; 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism; 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents; 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy; Notes; Chapter 1; Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy; 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots
1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads; 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism; 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya; 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots; Notes; Chapter 2; Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Skepticism; 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism; 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism; 2.3 Nāgārjuna's Two Phases
2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously2.5 Nāgārjuna's Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief; 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey's Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak; 2.7 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 3; Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism; 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna's Argumentative Strategies; 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī; 3.3 Nāgārjuna's Critique of Theories of Causation; 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations
3.5 The Cause of Skepticism3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism; Notes; Chapter 4; Jayarāśi's Cārvāka Skepticism; 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies; 4.2 Jayarāśi's Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism; 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism; 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection; 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion; 4.6 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 5; Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology; 5.1 Jayarāśi's Denial of Epistemological Realism
5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument; 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument; 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi's Skepticism About Philosophy; 5.6 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 6; Śrī Harṣa's Advaita Skepticism; 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism; 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism; 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism; 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience
~РУБ DDC 181/.4
Рубрики: Philosophy, Indic.
Skepticism--India.
PHILOSOPHY / Eastern.
Philosophy, Indic.
Skepticism.
India.
Аннотация: This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.
Доп.точки доступа:
Nāgārjuna,
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa,
Śrīharṣa,
M 70
Mills, Ethan.
Three pillars of skepticism in classical India : : Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa / / Ethan Mills. - Lanham, Maryland : : Lexington Books,, [2018]. - 1 online resource. - (Studies in comparative philosophy and religion). - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/BB5224AE-AFC3-4688-A497-F2C0A2F4467B. - ISBN 9781498555708 (electronic book). - ISBN 1498555705 (electronic book)
6.5 Śrī Harṣa's Development of Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism. Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on November 06, 2018).
Параллельные издания: Print version: : Mills, Ethan Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India : Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa. - : Lexington Books,c2018. - ISBN 9781498555692
Содержание:
Cover; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India; Series page; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations for Classical Texts; Introduction; 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India; 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism; 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents; 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy; Notes; Chapter 1; Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy; 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots
1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads; 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism; 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya; 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots; Notes; Chapter 2; Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Skepticism; 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism; 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism; 2.3 Nāgārjuna's Two Phases
2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously2.5 Nāgārjuna's Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief; 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey's Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak; 2.7 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 3; Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism; 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna's Argumentative Strategies; 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī; 3.3 Nāgārjuna's Critique of Theories of Causation; 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations
3.5 The Cause of Skepticism3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism; Notes; Chapter 4; Jayarāśi's Cārvāka Skepticism; 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies; 4.2 Jayarāśi's Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism; 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism; 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection; 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion; 4.6 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 5; Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology; 5.1 Jayarāśi's Denial of Epistemological Realism
5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument; 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument; 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi's Skepticism About Philosophy; 5.6 Conclusion; Notes; Chapter 6; Śrī Harṣa's Advaita Skepticism; 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism; 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism; 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism; 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience
Рубрики: Philosophy, Indic.
Skepticism--India.
PHILOSOPHY / Eastern.
Philosophy, Indic.
Skepticism.
India.
Аннотация: This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.
Доп.точки доступа:
Nāgārjuna,
Jayarāśibhaṭṭa,
Śrīharṣa,
2.
Подробнее
D 79
Doyle, James, (1963 November 18-).
No morality, no self : : Anscombe's radical skepticism / / James Doyle. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : : Harvard University Press,, 2018. - 1 online resource. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/11A1F727-724D-47C8-BD10-AFBEA8736585. - ISBN 9780674982819 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 0674982819 (electronic bk.)
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed February 16, 2018).
Содержание:
Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- The invention of 'morality' and the possibility of consequentialism -- The misguided project of vindicating morality -- The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension -- What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality? -- Assessing MMP -- Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of 'I' as a device of self-reference -- Is the fundamental reference rule for 'I' the key to explaining first person self-reference? -- Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem -- Can we make sense of a non-referential account of 'I'? -- Strategies for saving 'I' as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference -- The first person and abstraction -- Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.
~РУБ DDC 126
Рубрики: Ethics--Philosophy.
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism.
PHILOSOPHY--Mind & Body.
PSYCHOLOGY--Personality.
Ethics--Philosophy.
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism.
Аннотация: It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known papers, in which she advanced her most amazing theses. In 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958), she claimed that the term moral, understood as picking out a special, sui generis category, is literally senseless and should therefore be abandoned. In 'The First Person' (1975), she maintained that the word 'I' is not a referring expression: in other words, its function in the language is not to pick out the speaker, or 'the self' - or any entity whatsoever. Both papers are considered influential, and are frequently cited; but their main claims, and many of their arguments, have been widely misunderstood. In this book James Doyle shows that once various errors of interpretation have been cleared away, the claims can be seen to be far more plausible, and the arguments far more compelling, than even her defenders have realized. Philosophers often seek attention by making startling claims which are subsequently revealed as little more than commonplaces wrapped in hyperbole. Doyle's book makes it clear that here, in her greatest papers, Anscombe achieves something vanishingly rare in philosophy: a persuasive case for genuinely unsettling and profound conclusions. The two lines of argument, seemingly so disparate, are also shown to be connected by Anscombe's deep opposition to the Cartesian picture of the mind.--
Доп.точки доступа:
Anscombe, G. E. M.
D 79
Doyle, James, (1963 November 18-).
No morality, no self : : Anscombe's radical skepticism / / James Doyle. - Cambridge, Massachusetts : : Harvard University Press,, 2018. - 1 online resource. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - URL: https://library.dvfu.ru/lib/document/SK_ELIB/11A1F727-724D-47C8-BD10-AFBEA8736585. - ISBN 9780674982819 (electronic bk.). - ISBN 0674982819 (electronic bk.)
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed February 16, 2018).
Содержание:
Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- The invention of 'morality' and the possibility of consequentialism -- The misguided project of vindicating morality -- The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension -- What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality? -- Assessing MMP -- Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of 'I' as a device of self-reference -- Is the fundamental reference rule for 'I' the key to explaining first person self-reference? -- Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem -- Can we make sense of a non-referential account of 'I'? -- Strategies for saving 'I' as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference -- The first person and abstraction -- Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.
Рубрики: Ethics--Philosophy.
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism.
PHILOSOPHY--Mind & Body.
PSYCHOLOGY--Personality.
Ethics--Philosophy.
Self (Philosophy)
Skepticism.
Аннотация: It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known papers, in which she advanced her most amazing theses. In 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958), she claimed that the term moral, understood as picking out a special, sui generis category, is literally senseless and should therefore be abandoned. In 'The First Person' (1975), she maintained that the word 'I' is not a referring expression: in other words, its function in the language is not to pick out the speaker, or 'the self' - or any entity whatsoever. Both papers are considered influential, and are frequently cited; but their main claims, and many of their arguments, have been widely misunderstood. In this book James Doyle shows that once various errors of interpretation have been cleared away, the claims can be seen to be far more plausible, and the arguments far more compelling, than even her defenders have realized. Philosophers often seek attention by making startling claims which are subsequently revealed as little more than commonplaces wrapped in hyperbole. Doyle's book makes it clear that here, in her greatest papers, Anscombe achieves something vanishingly rare in philosophy: a persuasive case for genuinely unsettling and profound conclusions. The two lines of argument, seemingly so disparate, are also shown to be connected by Anscombe's deep opposition to the Cartesian picture of the mind.--
Доп.точки доступа:
Anscombe, G. E. M.
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